On November 22, 2016 the Board of the foreign Ministries of Belarus and Russia was held in Minsk. One of the topics discussed was the situation on the Belarusian-Russian border: from September of the current year the Russian side suspended the entrance of foreigners into its territory from the territory Belarus.
The reasons. Russian officials explain the decision by the absence of the international border checkpoints and the need to strengthen the fight against terrorism. Meanwhile, there were no these issues on the agenda for the previous 20 years.
The real reason is Russia’s attempt to force Belarus to create a common visa space of the so-called Union state. The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said that the Russian side “is promoting the idea of a common visa space for a very long time”. However, he forgot to mention that the original conductor of the initiative was the Secretary of this Union state Grigory Rapota. Official Minsk preferred to ignore the activity of the Lieutenant General of Foreign intelligence service of Russia Grigory Rapota. However, after several years the Kremlin got involved in the solution of the issue.
It’s necessary to pay attention to the fact, that after the Board of the foreign Ministries of Belarus and Russia General Rapota started be quite active in the information field on the development of a common visa space in our countries soon. The Belarusian officials prefer to ignore the discussion of this issue, stating that some experts, who will come up with some solution, should meet. What they will come up with is a big mystery. Nobody knows – that’s why they are the experts.
The chances. The creation of a common visa space involves coordinated, and de facto united policy of the two countries in this issue. Because of the difference in weight categories of Russia and Belarus, it would mean the transfer of part of national sovereignty to Moscow, which is totally unacceptable.
Firstly, the issue of visa liberalization are the field which the official Minsk is using to improve relations with the West. Secondly, the whole situation is frankly resembling a blackmail. The issue of a common visa policy was articulated by the Kremlin in an extremely uncomfortable time for the Belarusian regime, when the latter tries to prove to Western capitals that it has a high level of autonomy from Moscow. At the same time many circles in the West consider Belarus as a de facto vassal of Russia and ignore the complex multifaceted nature of Belarusian-Russian relations, where conflict and cooperation are quite normal. Thirdly, the official Minsk understands that by showing weakness in the visa issue the Belarusian authorities will cause a flood of new demands and ultimatums. Fourthly, if the visa policy is resolved in Moscow, a considerable part of officials of the Belarusian foreign Ministry will become unnecessary. Thus, even bureaucratic interests of the require firmness from the Belarusian diplomacy.
You can predict the repetition of the situation with the Russian airbase: a long period of development and coordination of the agreements and mechanisms on a common visa space at the expert level, then a long silence of President Lukashenka. And in the end, when the discussion of the issue becomes obscenely long even by the standards of the Belarusian-Russian relations, public disavowal of all previous agreements is stated.
“If a friend is not what he seems”. The Belarusian side is certainly interested in a fast solution of the problem of movement across the border with Russia for citizens of third countries. However, not at any price and certainly not at the cost of a common visa space.
Meanwhile, the situation requires at least a temporary solution. Otherwise it would mean a conflict at the political level. The Russian side doesn’t exclude the possibility to open temporary international border crossing points on the border with Belarus for citizens of third countries. An appropriate decision can be made in the next month.
With a high degree of confidence it can be assumed that the creation of temporary international border crossing points on the Belarusian-Russian border will be the first step in deploying a full-fledged border control on the border between the two countries. Objectively, there are situations when nationals of third countries will try to bypass these points, which puts on the agenda the issue of protection of the green border and deployment of corresponding engineering equipment there.
Of course, this process will take many years. However, this doesn’t matter. The very decision to start the process of border protection matters. That will allow Russian propaganda to build a logical chain: Belarus lets foreigners and terrorists to Russia, Russia is fencing off from Belarus by the fault of the latter, Belarus is no longer a friendly country to Russia. It would destroy, in large measure, the sympathy of Russian society to Belarus and to President Lukashenka personally. At the moment the Russians are mainly friendly towards Belarus, and President Lukashenka is the most popular foreign politician in Russia. The destruction of those sympathies will loosen the Kremlin’s hands to conduct a tougher policy towards Minsk. The level of such toughness will be determined in Moscow: from simply reducing preferences to the openly hostile policy like one that took place in Ukraine and Georgia in the 2000s.
Alas, but in Russia, television still wins in a fight with a refrigerator. So, there may be a need for new enemies.
What should be done. There is still a hope that the situation on the border is just another attempt to pressure on the official Minsk. And Moscow will retreat, like it previously happened more than one time. However, the results of President Lukashenka’s visit to Moscow on November 23, 2016 don’t inspire much optimism.
With the deployment of the Russian border guards at the green border the Belarusian authorities will have to take symmetrical measures. And it’s not limited only to the border guard. There is a need to revise the number of national army and the geography of its deployment.
So, it’s time for the Belarusian state propaganda to promote the idea of the necessity of control on the Eastern border and the fact that in the current situation of the military buildup (including in size) in Eastern Europe, it is necessary.
However, the border is strong not only by border guards and military, but primarily – by reliability of the population of border regions. Central authorities need to remember that in besides Minsk, regional centres and village of Aleksandryja there are other cities and villages in Belarus, in many of which the situation is so bad that the credibility and trust to the Belarusian authorities is severely impaired. This applies to 17 of the administrative districts along the border with Russia.
